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Abstract: The hyper-Russellian skeptic is someone who thinks that only one of
all your experiences was, is, and will ever be conscious. Which one? The very
one you are having now. Before you were always a zombie, and you will be a
zombie for ever after. In the present literature on the metaphysics of passage of
time, there is disagreement on whether our feeling that time passes — the
“dynamic flavor” of our ordinary experience — provides support to the A-theory,
that is, the thesis that the passage of time is an objective feature of reality.
Lately, several philosophers have argued against this idea. In this paper I want
to push this line of reasoning further by exploiting the hyper-Russellian scenario
against the A-theory of time.
Keywords: A-theory, temporal, experience, consciousness, skepticism
Introduction: A-theory, B-theory and Closeness
to Common Sense
The A-theory of time (i. e., the common core of the various A-theoretic approaches
to time) takes the passage of time to be an objective, mind-independent feature
of reality. It is usually construed as a form of tense realism: past, present and
future are genuine distinctions in reality, and as the present “moves along”,
its privileged metaphysical status shines on the successive parts of reality.1
The B-theory of time (i. e., the common core of the various B-theoretic approaches
to time) takes the passage of time to be illusory. According to the view, the present
has no privilege, and tenses are merely indexical devices for talking about posi-
tions in the temporal series from an (as it were) internal standpoint.
The A-theory is considered to be the metaphysical view that is closest to the
pre-theoretical stance of common sense. This seems correct. The central tenet of
*Corresponding author: Giuliano Torrengo, Centre for Philosophy of Time, Department of
Philosophy, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy, E-mail: giuliano.torrengo@unimi.it
1 What parts of reality exist along the temporal dimension, whether only the present exists or
also the past and the future, is a further matter of debate. In this paper, I am assuming that
existence is not confined in the present. See the end of the next section.
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the A-theory, namely that the present is ever changing, has the flavor of a
commonsense platitude. In comparison, the B-theoretic view of the distinction
between the past, the present and the future as being a “perspectival” effect of
our position in a tenseless series of events — true as it may turn out to be — is far
removed from our naive thinking, if not entirely counterintuitive.
Closeness to common sense is considered by many to be a pro tanto reason
for preferring a particular position over its rival(s). In what follows, I will
endorse such a “Moorean” take on metaphysics, and comply with the principle
that the less they diverge from common sense, the more virtuous our theories
are. However, there is a certain amount of vagueness in the very idea of what
‘closeness to common sense’ actually means, and at least with respect to certain
ways of construing the expression, the claim that the A-theory is closer to
common sense may be doubted. For instance, it has been argued that if we
assume the A-theory we are not in a better position to explain the dynamic
character of ordinary experience,2 and that a correct account of the phenomen-
ology of the experience of passage does not presuppose that the A-theory is true
and the B-theory is false.3 But even if the A-theorist cannot exploit features of
experience to provide abductive evidence for her position, she can still appeal to
the similarity or closeness between the central tenets of the A-theory and the
naive narrative that we provide in reconstructing how reality seems to us in its
temporal aspects. In this (perhaps minimal) sense, I take it to be uncontroversial
that the A-theory is ‘closer to common sense’ than the B-theory.4 Yet, even if we
don’t confuse conservativeness with respect to common sense with an abductive
advantage of the A-theory (namely the claim that the A-theory would allow us to
account better for our experience of the passage of time), there are reasons to
doubt whether the A-theory is actually supported by common sense — or at least
that is the central tenet that I defend in this paper.
In the next sections, I will first present an argument in favor of the A-theorist
based on the “Moorean principle” that closeness to common sense (in the
aforementioned sense) is a theoretical virtue (§ 2). Then I will argue against its
2 See Prosser (2013), and Paul (2010).
3 See Traynor (2014), and Almäng (2014). I defend an account of temporal phenomenology that
is compatible with the B-theory in Torrengo (2017a).
4 Deng (2013), Phillips (2014), and Hoerl (2014) also focus on the “folk” explanation of
temporal experience rather than on its (alleged) specific phenomenal character. None of them
seem to consider such a closeness to common sense to be a theoretical advantage of the
A-theory — although each for a different reason. I am wholly sympathetic to their stance, but
in what follows I would grant to the A-theorist that closeness to the way we ordinarily talk and
think about time and temporal experience is a theoretical advantage (with a proviso that will
become apparent in what follows).
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conclusion; roughly, my reasoning will be based on the assumption that the
reason why more conservative theories with respect to our pre-theoretical intui-
tions and narrative should be preferred to more exotic ones — all things being
equal — is that more conservative theories are better placed to withstand
skepticism about (relevant) commonsense truisms (§ 3). To make my point, I
discuss what I call Russellian Skepticism (§ 4) and the problem of the epistemic
privilege of the present (§ 5). These discussions will allow me to articulate an
argument against the alleged closeness of the A-theory to common sense based
on what I call Hyper-Russellian skepticism (§ 6).
A Moorean Argument for the A-theory
The “Moorean Principle” on which an A-theorist can base her argument leading
to the conclusion that common sense supports the A-theory over the B-theory
can be formulated as follows:
(MP) If it is part of the commonsense narrative about reality and our experience of it that
p, then a metaphysical theory M that entails that p is to be preferred to rival views (i.e.,
views that don’t entail that p), unless the costs of endorsing M are higher than those of
endorsing rival views.
By exploiting (MP), it is easy to construct a straightforward argument in favor of
the A-theory. Here it is:
(1) It is part of the commonsense narrative about reality and our experience of
it that time “really” passes [Ass.]
(2) The costs of the A-theory are not higher than those of rival views [Ass.]
(3) The A-theory entails that time “really” passes [Ass.]
(4) Therefore, the A-theory is to be preferred to rival views [1, 2, 3, MP]
My aim is to argue against assumption (2). However, I am not claiming here that
the A-theory fares worse with respect to either scientific theories, or McTaggart’s
paradox, or in any other aspect unconnected to its being closer to our naive way
of thinking about the passage of time. Quite the contrary, I am assuming here,
for the sake of argument, that bracketing the issue of closeness to common
sense, the A-theory and the B-theory are equally theoretically virtuous. Such an
Hyper-Russellian Skepticism 3
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assumption is a very friendly concession to my adversary. One of the striking
consequences of it is that, in order to attach (2), I will have to argue that the
A-theory has some additional costs — namely costs that the B-theory does not
have — as far as the issue of closeness to common sense is concerned.
My argument, though, will be limited in scope and will be focused against
only non-presentist forms of A-theory. In general, although all A-theories
encompass the thesis that the present is in some sense privileged, they may
differ in their ontology. Consider the different ways in which the privilege of the
present can be construed. Presentists take the privilege to be existence: only the
part of reality that is present exists. Non-presentist A-theorists take the privilege
of the present to be something else — typically, eternalist A-theorists (a.k.a.
“spotlight” theorists) consider it to be a primitive metaphysical status, and
“growing-blockers” construe it as the topological feature of being the latest
layer of reality. In this paper I will be concerned only with non-presentist
versions of the A-theory. This is an unfriendly assumption for an A-theorist, if
you wish, but I take presentism to be plagued with independent problems in any
case, and so if by endorsing a presentist ontology the A-theorist can escape my
argument, so be it. I am happy here to debate only with non-presentist
A-theorists. As even a brief overview of the current literature shows, I am not
targeting a straw-man.5
The Moorean and the Skeptic
As I said, I doubt that assumption (2) in the argument in the session above is
true, even granting that A-theory and B-theory are equally virtuous with respect
to any issue unconnected to closeness to common sense. This means that the
Moorean Principle MP could not be appealed to for a successful argument in
favor of the A-theory. In general, MP is justified in so far as the metaphysical
theory M to which it applies does not fare worse than its rivals in withstanding
“relevant” skeptical hypotheses, that is, skeptical hypotheses about common-
sense truisms concerning the topic of M. By ‘withstanding’ here I do not mean to
provide evidence against the skeptics. What I mean is that a metaphysical theory
5 See, for example, among the philosophers who defend non-presentist versions of the
A-theory, Forrest (2006), Skow (2009) (but Skow 2015 defends a form of B-theory), Sullivan
(2012), Cameron (2015) and Deasy (2015). I give an argument against the thesis that presentism
is close to common sense in Torrengo (2017b).
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M1 fares worse in withstanding a skeptical hypothesis concerning thesis p than a
theory M2, if M1 requires more additional premises than M2 to entail p.6
To clarify the point, consider a philosopher who exploits MP in order to
argue that the metaphysical thesis of realism about material objects (i. e., the
thesis that there exist ordinary, middle size, material objects) is true in the
following argument:
(1ʹ) It is part of the commonsense narrative about reality and our experience of
it that there exist material objects [Ass.]
(2ʹ) The costs of endorsing realism about material objects are not higher than
those of endorsing rival views [Ass.]
(3ʹ) Realism about material objects entails that there exist material objects
[Ass.]
(4ʹ) Therefore, realism about material objects is to be preferred to rival posi-
tions
[1’, 2’, 3’, MP]
Now, granting that realism with respect to material objects and its rival hypoth-
eses are equally virtuous when it comes to compatibility with scientific theories
and other matters unrelated to common sense considerations, we are justified in
using MP to argue in favor of realism about material objects, in so far realism
about material objects does not fare worse with respect to rival hypotheses in
ruling out the claim that commonsense truisms about material objects — such as
that material objects can be touched, seen, etc. — are false. If a realist about
material objects needed to make more costly hypotheses about reality in order to
explain how material objects can be touched than an anti-realist, then its
closeness to common sense would be illusory — in the sense that it should not
count as a theoretical virtue of the position. That is a simple consequence of the
fact that if realism about material objects has to assume more than anti-realism
in order to rule out skepticism with respect to truisms about material objects,
then premise (2ʹ) would be per force false.
With respect to the example of realism about material objects, I doubt that
an anti-realist could counter an argument like the one above by appealing to the
6 Of course, one has to weigh the theoretical costs of each premiss rather than count them, for
instance, by taking into account their complexity. But, as we shall see, this complication does
not affect my argument, so I stick to the simplified version of the claim in what follows.
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greater difficulty the realist would face in withstanding a skeptic about the
possibility of touching material objects (say). Regardless of the details, it is
very unlikely that a realist account of any truism — such as that material objects
can be touched — ends up being more costly than the anti-realist’s. However, is
the situation for an A-theorist different? I think it is, because there is at least one
skeptical hypothesis, which concerns a commonsense truism connected with the
passage of time, that forces the A-theorist to endorse more than a B-theorist in
order to withstand it. Consider the following two truisms about the passage of
time: (i) yesterday you existed; (ii) yesterday you were conscious. The first is
doubted by the Russellian skeptic, the second by the Hyper-Russellian skeptic.
While the A-theorist and the B-theorist will expend the same theoretical cost to
withstand the first form of skepticism, the A-theorist has to expend more to
withstand the second one — or so I will argue in the rest of the paper.
The Russellian Skeptic
In the Analysis of Mind, when he talks about memory as a putative source of
knowledge, Russell says:
There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five
minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that “remembered” a wholly unreal
past. There is no logically necessary connection between events at different times; there-
fore nothing that is happening now or will happen in the future can disprove the hypoth-
esis that the world began five minutes ago. Hence the occurrences which are called
knowledge of the past are logically independent of the past; they are wholly analysable
into present contents, which might, theoretically, be just what they are even if no past had
existed. (Russell 1921)
Let us call a “Russellian” skeptic someone who doubts the existence of that part
of the past that reaches farther back in time than five minutes ago. According to
the Russellian skeptic’s hypothesis, the world as we experience it, with all our
memories and external traces of the past, popped into existence just a few
minutes ago. Such a hypothesis is compatible with all the present evidence
that we have, but not with the thesis that I will call realism about the past. A
realist about the past takes the world to have existed for as long as the ordinary
(and scientific) evidence indicates. Common sense is an ally of realism about the
past, and the realist can exploit MP and argue in its favor as follows:
(1.a) It is part of the commonsense narrative about reality and our experience
of it that the world has existed for longer than few minutes [Ass.]
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(2.a) The costs of endorsing realism about the past are not higher than those of
endorsing rival views [Ass.]
(3.a) Realism about the past entails that the world has existed for longer than a
few minutes [Ass.]
(4.a) Therefore, realism about the past is to be preferred to rival positions [1.a,
2.a, 3.a, MP]
Note that the Russellian skeptic does not (necessarily) question the reality of the
passage of time or the reality of tenses. Regardless of whether she takes expres-
sions as “event e is now past” as expressing substantive facts, or as being an
indexical description (true or false only relative to temporal parameters) of the
position in the temporal series of e, the realist can counter-argue the Russellian
skeptic by appealing to the similarity between the commonsense narrative about
reality and her position. The Russellian skeptic doubts that the world existed
more than a few minutes ago. The realist replies that present evidence of its
earlier existence (e. g., my memory of having had breakfast yesterday, or dino-
saur fossils) disprove the skeptic’s hypothesis.7 As a consequence, the costs for
withstanding the Russellian skeptics are exactly the same for the A-theory and
the B-theory — namely, endorsing the thesis of realism about the past. Thus,
given that we have assumed that apart from the issue of passage of time and
skepticism of commonsense truisms connected to it the two views are equally
virtuous, neither party can appeal to an MP-based argument against the other
(or, more, precisely, both can appeal equally well, hence ineffectively, given that
the combination of the A-theory and realism about the past and the combination
of the B-theory and realism about the past do not count as “rival views”
according to the gloss in MP).
7 Does a realist about the past have to be an eternalist (or at least a non-presentist)? We have to
be careful in answering. On the one hand, disqualifying any present evidence that the world
existed longer than five minutes ago is compatible with maintaining that the past exists as
much as the present — it just happens to be much “shorter” than common sense and science tell
us it is. Hence, it is not merely by denying an ontological difference between the present and the
past that the realist can withstand the skeptic. On the other hand, the skeptical hypothesis
seems to push a presentist towards some sort of Dummettian anti-realism with respect to the
past (See Dummett 1969). At any rate, my argument here is restricted to non-presentist forms of
A-theory, as I made clear in § 2.
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The Epistemic Privilege of the Present
Before introducing the Hyper-Russellian skeptic, I need to make a short detour
through a related problem. In the recent literature on the growing block view of
time — the position according to which reality is an ever-growing block of past
and present facts, we find discussions about what I will call “the problem of the
epistemic privilege of the present”.8 As is generally acknowledged, the problem
holds not only for the growing block view, but also for any form of non-
presentist A-theory, such as the moving spotlight view. Namely, it holds for
any theory according to which the flow of the present is an objective feature of
reality, but not only what is present exists. In order to see the problem, consider
my present experience of seeing something red and my past experience of seeing
something green. In the growing block view (as in the moving spotlight view),
the difference between these two experiences is not a difference concerning
what exists, but a difference concerning their “tensedness”. Present experiences
are irreducibly involved in present-tensed facts (such as the fact that I am now
experiencing red), while past experiences are irreducibly involved in past-tensed
facts (such as the fact that I was experiencing green).9
The problem for a non-presentist A-theory is that from an epistemic point of
view such a distinction in one’s experience seems impossible to account for. Take
the experience that Caesar had when, while crossing the Rubicon in 44 B.C., he
thought “Now I am changing history”. According to the non-presentist A-theorist,
even now, at the moment you read these lines, reality contains that conscious
experience — that is, an event in which Caesar thinks of himself as being in the
present. But Caesar is wrong now that the present has moved ahead, although he
was right back then. And how can he detect such a difference with respect to the
content of his experience? Even more dramatically, how can we be sure we are not
in Caesar’s situation? For all we know, the present could be in what is, from our
point of view, the distant future. Indeed, given that there is only one present
moment and an enormous amount of past ones, we are much more likely to be in
the past than in the present. This is sad, disappointing, crazy, and — more impor-
tantly — almost certainly false as the theory that entails it.
8 See Bourne (2002), Braddon-Mitchell (2004), Forrest (2004), Heathwood (2005), Merricks
(2006), Correia and Rosenkranz (2013), and Forbes (2015).
9 Being “irreducibly involved”means that the fact that I was experiencing green cannot be reduced
to the fact that at a certain time t (contextually individuated as one earlier than the time t0 we are
considering as present) I am experiencing green. There are various ways to spell out the idea of a
substantive, fundamental difference between the present and the past (facts, properties, etc.; see
Fine 2005 and Sider 2011). Nothing substantial for my point hinges on the version one endorses.
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Note that the B-theory is not liable to this objection. According to the
B-theory, every conscious experience is present with respect to the time of its
occurrence, and every experience that represents itself as present is correct with
respect to it. Thus, Caesar’s thought is correct with respect to its time of
occurrence, as much as we are correct when we think of our experience as
occurring in the present.
Neither strategy is available to the non-presentist A-theorist: she cannot
restrict her ontology to include only present experiences, and she cannot accept
that each experience is experienced as present only relative to the time of its
occurrence. However, she can solve the puzzle by exploiting the uniqueness of the
present in her picture in some other way in order to mark a distinction between
what is present simpliciter and objectively, and what is just present-relative-to-its-
time-of-occurrence.10 Roughly, the idea is that she can maintain that only experi-
ences that are present simpliciter (e. g., ours, but not Caesar’s) are available to
their subjects. Although the notion of ‘being available’ is rather vague,11 it seems
reasonable to say that only when an experience is available can one entertain the
corresponding thought (and experience the corresponding phenomenal charac-
ter). Thus, for each experience e, only when e is present simpliciter is it available
and can be judged (correctly) to be present. The past is not replete with mistaken
beliefs, because the past is replete with “zombie beliefs”, and zombie beliefs are
not beliefs at all — at least no consciously occurring token-beliefs.
What I wish to stress by illustrating the non-presentist A-theorist’s solution
to the problem of the epistemic privilege of the present is that it entails that an
event e can change from being a conscious experience when it is present and
available to being an event that is not a conscious experience, although it would
one were it present and available. Let us denote by “C” the description “the set
of brain facts that qualify event e that occurs at time t as a conscious experience
at t”; that is, the facts concerning neural activity, interaction with the environ-
ment, and whatever it takes for a physical system to achieve consciousness.12
According to the B-theorist, the facts in C do not change over time; they are the
10 See Russell (2017) “One of the peculiarities of [non presentist forms of A-theory] is that they
involve two different ways of talking about time[…]. Events have temporal locations, as they
precede some events and succeed others in arrangement of temporally spread-out reality. But
there is also supposed to be a sense in which the block grows, or the spotlight moves — the
sense in which absolute presence changes” (p. 163).
11 I take it from Skow (2011). Although Skow is not discussing the problem of the epistemic
privilege of the present, I take it to be a useful notion to generalizes to sorts of strategies against
such a problem that defenders of non-presentist A-theories have proposed in the literature.
12 To simplify the discussion, I am assuming here that some form of physicalism is true.
However, nothing would substantially change if in C we assume there are irreducibly
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tenseless facts that ground the tenseless fact that experience e is conscious-at-t
and available-at-t. According to the A-theorist, facts in C are tensed and they
change as time goes by. Thus, only when e is present does C contain the facts
that ground the tensed fact that e is conscious and available simpliciter. When e
is past (or future) in C there are facts that ground the fact that e was (or will be) a
conscious experience, and thus in C there is no ground for e being available and
thus conscious. This is how it should be. The past exists, but there are no
conscious acts in it. That is, in the past, now, there are only zombies, although
there were once conscious beings. I am not taking issue here with the
A-theorist’s solution to the problem of the epistemic privilege of the present.
The problem does not lie here; rather, as we will see, it lies in establishing where
this solution leads the A-theorist when faced with the Hyper-Russellian skeptic.
The Hyper-Russellian
We are now ready to dismiss the claim that the A-theory is (in the above-
mentioned sense) closer to common sense than the B-theory. What I have called
the “hyper-Russellian skeptic” (HRS for short) is less radical than the Russellian
skeptic as far as existence is concerned. Her hypothesis is not that the universe
was created a few moments ago; nor is it that our past experiences did not
actually exist. According to the HRS, the whole series of experiences that
constitute one’s life exist. If she is a B-theorist, she will add that each experience
is present relative to the time of its occurrence and past/future relative to the
experiences that precede/follow it. If she is an A-theorist, she will add that only
one experience is present simpliciter, while the others are past and future. What
the hyper-Russellian skeptic doubts is that all our past (future) experiences have
been (will be) conscious and available to us. She is skeptical because she thinks
that — for all we know — this experience that you are having now is the only
conscious experience that you ever had, have or will have, even if reality is
constituted by all past and future brain facts that you (mistakenly) think were
and will be available to you. We are conscious, but we were and we will be
zombies! The hyper-Russellian skeptic hypothesis that the experience occurring
at t is the only conscious one is defeated as soon as we have another experience
at a later moment t1. But, with respect to each moment, we cannot refute her
hypothesis on the grounds of experience alone, since at each moment, if it were
phenomenal facts of some sort. Besides, I will — a bit sloppily — talk of “the facts in C” to refer
to the facts in the set denoted by a given occurrence of “C”.
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true that past experiences existed (and future ones will exist) without having
been conscious, our present experience would not be different.13
The fact that experience is compatible with the HRS hypothesis does not
prevent common sense from telling us that reality is not like the hyper-
Russellian says it is. Ordinary experience and common sense come not only
with the assumption that the past was once present, and the future will also be
present, but also the assumption that past conscious experiences were once
available to us, and future conscious experiences will be available to us. Since
those are truisms connected with the commonsense idea that time “really”
passes, if the A-theory were not also able to withstand skepticism about them,
this would be very bad news for the soundness of an argument in favor of the
A-theory based on the commonsense thesis that time “really” passes and the MP.
But what does it takes to withstand the hyper-Russellian skeptic? That is,
what (conjunction of) theses entail the falsity of her hypothesis? There are
different options, and we should opt for the one that is the least costly. Let us
focus on the skeptical hypothesis about past conscious experiences for simpli-
city. The HRS doubts that her present memories of her own past, even if they do
“correspond” to past states of her brain, were ever available to her and con-
scious. Thus, endorsing the thesis which before I called ‘realism about the past’
is not enough to withstand her, as it had been to withstand the Russellian
skeptic. However, it may turn out that the conjunction of the thesis of realism
about the past and one or more metaphysical thesis is enough to rule out the
skeptical hypothesis. I argue that the B-theory alone suffices for this purpose,
while we need to couple the conjunction of the A-theory and realism about the
past with a further thesis in order to rule out the hyper-Russellian hypothesis.
Hence, the surprising conclusion is that — by MP standards — common sense
supports the B-theory rather than the A-theory.
What is, then, the difference between the A-theory and the B-theory with
respect to the possibility of withstanding the HRS? Let us list what a B-theorist
has to accept in order to rule out the skeptical hypothesis of the hyper-
Russellian. The B-theorist only has to accept that there has been a succession
of experiences with the brain properties required for consciousness. This is a
claim that is entailed by realism about the past: surely we have plenty of
ordinary evidence for this, and if realism is correct, it follows that those experi-
ences existed. But then, in a B-theoretic framework, realism about the past is
13 Note that I am not assuming that experiences are instantaneous. Experiences can have a
duration even for the hyper-Russellian skeptic. Her claim is that, whatever the duration of the
experience you are having now, that experience is the only conscious experience that you have
ever had, and will ever have.
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enough to rule out the skeptical hypothesis of the HRS. The mere existence of
those experiences in succession suffices for them to be conscious and available
to us relative to their time of occurrence. Therefore, when at t the skeptic asks
the B-theorist to provide a justification for her belief that yesterday her experi-
ence e-1 was conscious, she can answer that the hypothesis that e-1 exists and
has the brain properties required for being conscious suffices to justify her belief
that e-1 was conscious at the time of its occurrence. Thus, the following argu-
ment in favor of the conjunction of B-theory and realism about the past can be
formulated.
(1.b) It is part of the commonsense narrative about reality and our experience
of it that past conscious experiences were once available to us [Ass.]
(2.b) The costs of endorsing the B-theory and realism about the past are not
higher than those of endorsing rival views [Ass.]
(3.b) The B-theory and realism about the past entails that past conscious
experiences were once available to us [Ass.]
(4.b) Therefore, the conjunction of B-theory and realism about the past is to be
preferred to rival positions [1.b, 2.b, 3.b, MP]
In a sense, the HRS hypothesis is simply incoherent in a B-theoretic framework once
we accept realism about the past. Of course, the skeptic may still insist that, for all
we know the past contained only zombie versions of ourselves, for instance because
until this very moment certain essential properties for there being consciousness in
you were not instantiated by your brain. But that is a different skeptical hypothesis,
one against which no position concerning the metaphysics of time can do much.
(And it may be doubted that it is compatible with realism about the past).
The situation is different for the A-theorist. As we noted above, in the
A-theoretic framework, an event e can change from being a conscious experi-
ence when it is present and available to being an event that is not a conscious
experience, although it would one were it present and available. Thus, even
assuming that one’s experiences existed and would be conscious were it pre-
sent, this is not enough for the A-theorist to rule out the possibility that yester-
day they were not available to us. The A-theorist must also assume that the
present “shone on them” yesterday. Their mere present existence in the past is
compatible with the skeptical hypothesis that they never were available to us.
An A-theorist may be tempted to protest that now e-1 is such that it was
available and conscious. However, remember that it is crucial for her position
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that only experiences that are presently available are available simpliciter.
Thus, it is not simply the hypothesis that e is now present and available and
that e-1 came before e that can rule out the skeptical hypothesis that e is the
only conscious experience you ever had (more on this in the next paragraph).
What we need to rule this out is the further hypothesis that we are not in a
world where, although all the past experiences also exist, only one of them is
present – the one that the skeptic is addressing. In such a frozen present
scenario our experience would be indistinguishable from our actual experi-
ence, tense realism would be true, but the HRS hypothesis, too, would be
true.
Now, the B-theorist has an advantage over the A-theorist when it comes to
the assumption one has to make to rule out the HRS hypothesis; since the
A-theorist has to make the same assumption as the B-theorist (i. e., realism
about the past) plus a further one, namely, that the present is not stuck in the
experience that the skeptics claims is the only conscious one. The point is clear
if we formulate an argument in favour of the A-theory which has the same
structure as the previous one in favour of the B-theory. Here it is:
(1.c) It is part of the commonsense narrative about reality and our experience
of it that past conscious experiences were once available to us [Ass.]
(2.c) The costs of endorsing the A-theory, realism about the past and the falsity
of the frozen present scenario are not higher than those of endorsing rival
views [Ass.]
(3.c) The A-theory, realism about the past and the falsity of the frozen present
scenario, entails that past conscious experiences were once available to
us [Ass.]
(4.c) Therefore, the conjunction of the A-theory, realism about the past and the
falsity of the frozen present scenario is to be preferred to rival positions
[1.c, 2.c, 3.c, MP]
The advantage of the B-theorist consists in the fact that (2.c) cannot be true.
Assuming that A-theory and B-theory are otherwise on a par with respect to
costs and advantages (as I do, for the sake of argument), and that the two views
are rivals, it follows that it cannot be the case that the A-theory, realism about
the past, and the negation of the frozen present scenario is a less costly
combination of theses than any of its rivals, in particular the conjunction of
the B-theory with realism about the past.
Hyper-Russellian Skepticism 13
Brought to you by | Università degli Studi di Milano
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/28/17 3:36 PM
Is the Denial of the Frozen Present Scenario a Cost
for the A-theorist?
There is an obvious objection to the conclusion just drawn: you say that endor-
sing the denial of the tensed frozen scenario is a further hypothesis for an
A-theorist, but how can it be so given that the very core of the A-theory is that
time “really” passes? The A-theory is not merely tense realism, it is tense realism
coupled with the claim that at the fundamental level one time is present, and
other times were and will be present. And this latter claim should not be
construed in B-theoretic terms, i. e. as an expressions of relations between
times or event in the temporal series, but as a constituted by primitively tensed
expression. In other words, when an A-theorist says that now e-1 is such that it
was available and conscious, her claims entail that the present has moved, i. e.
that the frozen present scenario is ruled out.
We have to be careful here, and distinguish what a tensed description of
reality taken as fundamental (i. e. tense realism) entails, and what is the aim of
the A-theorist in claiming that the tensed picture of reality is fundamental. I do
not deny that the A-theorist’s intention is to take the passage of time as seriously
as possible, but I do deny that endorsing tense realism and making the funda-
mentality claim above is enough to justify the soundness of the argument (1)–
(4). In other words, an A-theorist can vindicate the robust sense of passage
involved in the common sense narrative about reality and embrace the denial of
the frozen present scenario, only if she goes beyond mere tense realism and
“enriches” tenses with an irreducibly dynamic trait. I have argued for such a
claim (Torrengo 2017c), here let me notice that I am not the only one who thinks
something along those lines. Philosophers as diverse as Kit Fine, Huw Price and
David Lipman share the same worry. Here is Lipman:
But the tensed descriptions do not capture the passage of time at all. Given that any sentence
A states what obtains right now, any fact whatsoever is a current fact; in particular, that
something will obtain and that something has obtained are themselves current facts. At the
heart of the A-theory lies the mentioned principle that any sentence states what currently
obtains, that any sentence is merely descriptive of the current state of the world. This implies
that any sentence only ever specifies the contents of a single momentary stage in time,
namely the current one. To state that something obtains is just to describe more of the
current stage in history, and not the passing from that stage of history to the next.14
14 Lipman (forthcoming). See also Price (2011: 279); cf. Fine (2005: § 7) (quoted by Lipman right
after the passage above). Leininger (forthcoming) argues that presentism (but possibly not other
forms of A-theory) cannot account for objective passage.
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If this is correct, then, fundamental tenses per se requires an additional dynamic
element to yield a picture of reality in which we find robust passage. However,
even if my opponent grants me that the denial of the frozen present scenario is a
further claim that an A-theories has to make, it does not follow that such a claim
is a further cost of the position in the relevant sense here. After all, that time
“really” passes is part of the common-sense narrative about reality, and thus
that the present is not stuck at some point should not count as cost as far as the
issue of closeness to common sense is concerned. Again, here we have to be
careful. In making fundamentality claims about the movement of the present,
the A-theorist is giving her account of the passage of time. Given that her
account of the passage aims at being a realist one, as opposed to what a
B-theorist is doing when she claims that the fundamental level of reality
encompasses only facts about events come earlier and after other events,
A-theorists have to do (implicitly or explicitly) such an assumption. However,
how the challenge of the hyper-russellian makes clear, it is not an assumption
that simply reflect how reality appears to us in experience. After all, a defender of
the frozen present scenario could argue that her theory is more economical than
tense realism plus a dynamic present, and yet equally adequate with respect to
experience.15 Therefore, even if it is not a further assumption for an A-theorist as
usually understood, it is a cost from the perspective of our naive narrative of
reality, one that the B-theorist does not need to do to rule out the HRS
hypothesis.
Conclusions
The moral from the last two sections is that the assumptions that the B-theorist has
to make to show that the HRS is wrong are less costly than those that the A-theorist
must make. This is so by any sensible weighting of the costs, given that we have
granted that the A-theory and the B-theory fare equally well in other respects, and
both have to make the assumption of realism about the past; but only the A-theorist
has to make the further assumption that the present is not stuck where the HRS
suspects it is. This further assumption is not a huge cost for the A-theorist, and it is
15 As Cameron (2015: 84–85) points out, in a world where the present is “stuck”, we could still
speak as if we were in a moving spotlight world, by providing a semantics for “ordinary claims
concerning the changing of what time is present” (p. 85) in B-theoretic terms. But this does not
mean that there is not a metaphysical difference between a position according to which at the
fundamental level the present is stuck at one time and one in which the present moves along
the temporal series.
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very much in line with the very spirit of the position. However, it is a further cost,
and this— dialectically — is very important, since it concerns a “Moorean” kind of
advantage (being more economical in resisting the skeptical hypotheses about
commonsense truisms) which is usually considered a characteristic of the A-theory
rather than of the B-theory. In other words, the Hyper-Russellian allows the
B-theorist a victory right in the middle of the enemy’s territory.
Acknowledgements: For useful comments, thanks to an anonymous referee and
to the people at the Center for Philosophy of Time for useful comments. Thanks
to the project 2015-0746 (15-5-3007000-601) of Fondazione Cariplo and Regione
Lombardia, and project 15-6-3007000-2021 of Università degli Studi di Milano for
financial supports.
Bibliography
Almäng, J. 2014. “Tense as Feature of Perceptual Content.” Journal of Philosophy 7:361–378.
Bourne, C. 2002. “When Am I? A Tense Time for Some Tense Theorists?” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 80:359–371.
Braddon-Mitchell, D. 2004. “How Do We Know It Is Now Now?” Analysis 64:199–203.
Cameron, R. 2015. The Moving Spotlight. an Essay on Time and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Correia, F., and S. Rosenkranz. 2013. “Living on the Brink, or Welcome Back, Growing Block!” In
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, eds K. Bennett and D.W. Zimmerman, Vol. 8, 333–350.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deasy, D. 2015. “The Moving Spotlight Theory.” Philosophical Studies 172:2073–2089.
Deng, N. 2013. “On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 51
(3):367–382.
Dummett, M. 1969. “The Reality of the Past.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
69:139–158.
Fine, K. 2005. “Tense and Reality”, in Id. Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers, 261–320.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Forbes, G.A. 2015. “The Growing Block’s past Problems.” Philosophical Studies 173: 699–709.
Forrest, P. 2004. “The Real but Dead Past: A Reply to Braddon-Mitchell.” Analysis 64:358–362.
Forrest, P. 2006. “General Facts, Physical Necessity, and the Metaphysics of Time.” Oxford
Studies in Metaphysics 2:137–154.
Heathwood, C. 2005. “The Real Price of the Dead Past: A Reply to Forrest and to Braddon-
Mitchell.” Analysis 65:249–251.
Hoerl, C. 2014. “Do We (Seem To) Perceive Passage?” Philosophical Explorations 17:188–202.
Leininger, L. 2015. “Presentism and the Myth of Passage.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
93 (4):724–739.
Lipman, M., forthcoming, “A Passage Theory of Time.” Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 11.
16 G. Torrengo
Brought to you by | Università degli Studi di Milano
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/28/17 3:36 PM
Merricks, T. 2006. “Goodbye Growing Block.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, edited by
K. Bennett and D.W. Zimmerman, Vol. 2, 103–110. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Paul, L.A. 2010. “Temporal Experience.” Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333–359.
Phillips, I. 2014. “Experience of and in Time.” Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131–144.
Price, H. 2011. “The Flow of Time.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Time, edited by
C. Callender, 276–311. Oxford: OUP.
Prosser, S. 2013. “Passage and Perception.” Noûs 47 (1):69–84.
Russell, B. 1921. Analysis of Mind. London: G. Allen and Unwin.
Russell, J.S. 2015. “Temporary Safety Hazards.” NoûS (online first).
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